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DODD-FRANK ACT AND REMITTANCES 
TO POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES:    
THE LAW OF UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES STRIKES AGAIN 
Raymond Natter*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
he Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) was enacted in response 
to the financial crisis that began in 2007. There are many reasons 
that have been identified as a significant cause of the crisis,1 and, 
in response, the Dodd-Frank Act (“Act”) mandates a wide array 
of changes in the regulation of financial institutions and financial 
products. The Act is an omnibus legislative document that 
contains hundreds of sections and over 800 pages of text. Many of 
                                                     
 *  Partner, Barnett Sivon & Natter, P.C., Washington, D.C., formerly 
Deputy Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1995-2004.  
Georgetown University, J.D., 1975; the George Washington University 
National Law Center, LL.M, 1979. Barnett Sivon & Natter, P.C. represents 
financial institutions, including companies that engage in remittance transfer 
activities. However, the views expressed in this article are solely those of the 
author. I wish to thank Katie Wechsler, Associate at Barnett Sivon & Natter, 
P.C. for her invaluable assistance in preparing this article. The author 
originally wrote this article for a report by the Task Force on Remittances in 
Post-Conflict States convened jointly by Boston University’s Center on 
Finance, Law & Policy and the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the 
Longer-Range Future.  It will be republished there in full in 2013. 
 1  See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT (Jan. 2011); Gary Gorton, Questions and Answers about the 
Financial Crisis Prepared for the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(Feb. 20, 2010), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/crisisqa0210.pdf. 
T 
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those sections relate to consumer protection. As such, the Act 
established a new agency, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”), which received almost all of the consumer 
protection powers of the federal banking agencies.2 
Among them is the power to implement and enforce most 
sections of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”).3 In 
addition, section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the 
EFTA to provide a new regulatory framework for remittance 
transfers made from the United States to a foreign country.4 The 
regulatory framework includes detailed disclosure requirements 
and error resolution procedures, and establishes significant civil 
liability (both fines and potential class action suits) for violation 
of these requirements.5 
This note will discuss the regulatory implementation of 
section 1073, and focus on the impact this new regulatory regime 
will have on remittance transfers to post-conflict countries. The 
note concludes that the proposed regulatory treatment may have 
the unintended consequence of impeding the use of regulated 
remittance transfer providers for sending funds to these countries. 
II.THE IMPORTANCE OF REMITTANCES FOR POST-
CONFLICT COUNTRIES 
A. Post-Conflict Countries 
A post-conflict country is typically defined as a nation that 
is emerging from a severe conflict. In these countries, open 
warfare has ended, but a potential for violence remains.6 Studies 
have shown that post-conflict situations are characterized by 
human loss, destruction of infrastructure and means of 
production, as well as adverse economic and political 
consequences.7 The main goals of post-conflict transition and 
                                                     
 2  12 U.S.C. §§ 5581-5583. 
 3  Dodd-Frank Act § 1084. 
 4  15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1. 
 5   Id. 
 6  PETER WALLENSTEEN, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
WAR, PEACE AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (SAGE Publications, 2nd ed. 2007). 
 7  Paul Collier, Doing Well out of War 14-16 (The World Bank 1999), 
available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/intknowledgeforchange/Resources/491519-
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recovery are achieving peace, sustaining economic growth, and 
reducing poverty.8 The establishment of sustainable institutions 
is often the most important step in achieving security and growth 
in post-conflict situations.9 
In post-conflict situations, there is an absence of war, but 
not necessarily real peace. The end of fighting offers an 
opportunity to work towards lasting peace, but that requires the 
establishment of viable institutions, capable of sustaining lasting 
security for the entire population.10 Extended conflict leads to the 
collapse of the systems and institutions that make a stable society 
function and these are the systems that need to be resurrected.11 
The instability common in post-conflict countries constrains 
investment.12 The collapse in law and order is disruptive to 
political and economic governance, thereby increasing 
uncertainty and making contract enforcement difficult.13  
Dramatic changes in financial rules and practices may be 
common in these nations, financial infrastructure is damaged, 
and financial conduits may not function properly. Business norms 
may change dramatically due to changes in economic conditions 
or government leadership. Formal payments systems and 
financial intermediation may function poorly or not at all.14 
B. Role of Remittances in Post-Conflict Countries 
Remittances are funds sent home by nationals living and 
working in other countries, usually to family members in the 
country of origin. In achieving stability and economic security, 
                                                     
1199818447826/28137.pdf. 
 8  U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID), 
UNDERSTANDING THE POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY ANALYTICAL TEMPLATE 3 
(2009). 
 9  Lakhdar Brahimi, State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries 
3-4, Seventh Global Forum on Reinventing Government (June 2007). 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Janvier Nkurunziza, Civil War and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in 
Africa 23, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2008). 
 13  Id. 
 14  Rob Mills & Qimiao Fan, Investment Climate in Post Conflict 
Situations 11-12 (World Bank Pol’y Research, Working Paper No. 4055, 
2006). 
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post-conflict nations rely heavily on these remittances.15 The 
funds are widely distributed and flow to many areas that are 
neglected by other forms of aid.16 Funds sent from abroad are 
generally spent on individual or household private needs, such as 
food and housing, and create ripple effects throughout the local 
economy.17 Remittances help the national balance of payments, 
boost economic development, and improve the general standard 
of living.18 
There is no question that remittances have become a 
critical source of foreign currency for many post-conflict nations. 
Countries in conflict generate a significant diaspora, a portion of 
which prefers its new life to repatriation after the conflict but 
seeks to support relatives who remained behind.19 As a result, in 
post-conflict areas, remittances have become a critical source of 
capital for development and stability.20 In many post-conflict 
nations remittances exceed the total amount of official 
development assistance, and in about one-third of all developing 
countries, remittances exceed all capital flows.21 A recent World 
Bank study found that remittances “play a vital and life-
sustaining role for millions of vulnerable people in poor countries, 
particularly in post-conflict countries and in situations where 
formal financial services and infrastructures are nonexistent.”22 
In addition, remittances tend to be markedly more stable 
                                                     
 15  ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY, FRAGILE STATES RESOURCE FLOWS AND TRENDS 
42 (2013). 
 16  Russell King and Julie Vullnetari, Remittances, Return, Diaspora: 
Framing the Debate in the Context of Albania and Kosovo, 9 SE. EUR. AND 
BLACK SEA STUD. 385, 390 (2009). 
 17  Id. at 391. 
 18  K. M. Abdul Azeez and M. Begum, International Remittances: A 
Source of Development Finance, 4 INT’L NGO J. 299, 301-04 (2009). 
 19  See U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, 
at 34. 
 20  In 2010, formal remittance flows worldwide exceeded $440 billion, with 
approximately $330 billion sent to developing countries.  This is three times 
the amount of official aid provided to these nations, and approximates the 
aggregate amount of foreign direct investment in these countries. THE WORLD 
BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACT BOOK 2011 268 (2nd Ed. 2011). 
 21  Id. at 17. 
 22  THE WORLD BANK, REMITTANCES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 13 (Samuel Munzele Maimbo & Dilip Ratha eds., 2005). 
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than other private capital flows, such as portfolio investments 
and bank credits.23 The importance of remittances in helping 
post-conflict countries was emphasized in a report issued by the 
International Peace Academy which stated:  
Nearly all the countries in the conflict, war-to-peace 
transition, and crisis categories are highly dependent on 
remittances. The slow recovery of livelihoods and 
persistent violence or repression ensure high levels of 
migration and the need for remittances in such countries 
for several years after conflict and crises have ended. By 
all accounts, migrant remittances reduce poverty in 
important ways in developing countries. Research 
shows that migrants transfer funds and invest in their 
countries of origin at times when international 
investment has all but disappeared. By serving these 
purposes in countries emerging from or still 
experiencing conflicts . . . remittances can be seen as a 
sine qua non for peace and rebuilding.24 
C. Impact of Regulation 
Studies indicate that a significant portion of remittance 
transfers flow through unregulated channels and the use of such 
informal channels hamper efforts to prevent funds from flowing 
to entities that engage in criminal or terrorist activities.25 The 
                                                     
 23  Historically, remittances have been stable and even countercyclical, 
tending to rise during times of financial crisis and natural disasters because 
migrants living abroad send more money to help their families back in places 
of origin.  UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, TOWARDS HUMAN 
RESILIENCE: SUSTAINING MDG PROGRESS IN AN AGE OF ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 129 (2011), available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusi
ve%20development/Towards%20Human%20Resilience/Towards_Sustaining
MDGProgress_Ch4.pdf. 
 24  Patricia Weiss Fagen and Micah N. Bump, Remittances in Conflict and 
Crises: How Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crisis and Transitions 
to Peace, International Peace Academy and Georgetown University (2005) 
[hereinafter Fagen & Bump]. 
 25  That unregulated transfer systems are open to abuse—ranging from 
money laundering to support for  terroristactivity—is well documented.  Id. at 
11. 
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preference among remitters for informal transfer mechanisms 
partly reflects low financial literacy, as well as widespread 
distrust of government and financial institutions.26 Resorting to 
informal channels also results from the deterrent effect of what is 
viewed by the immigrant community as the “intimidating 
regulatory apparatus” erected to staunch money laundering and 
terrorist financing.27 
Studies have indicated that the remittances most adversely 
affected by regulatory control are those transferring funds to 
countries with weak governments, whose institutions are not 
reliable, and whose criminal activity is high28 These are the 
characteristics of many post-conflict nations. As a result, a 
substantial number of migrants who consider supporting their 
families to be an urgent commitment do not use regulated 
remittance services.29 The unintended consequences of the 
regulatory scheme in the U.S. was noted in a 2005 study by the 
International Peace Academy:  
The regulatory system in place—especially in the 
United States following the Patriot Act of 2001—was 
intended to prevent abuses. It may well be serving this 
purpose . . . but the cost has been high. Indeed, 
burdensome regulations challenge the ability of 
legitimate institutions and businesses to process money 
lawfully. The regulations impose stiff economic and 
bureaucratic burdens. . . . The use and, at times, abuse 
of regulations has led to blacklisting remittance transfer 
agencies on the basis of perceived irregularities or minor 
infractions. The system put in place to target criminal 
                                                     
 26  Stuart Brown, Can Remittances Spur Development? A Critical Survey, 
8 INT’L STUD. REV. 55, 56 (2006). 
 27  Id.; CATALINA AMUEDO-DURANTES ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 
OF ATLANTA, ON THE REMITTING PATTERNS OF IMMIGRANTS: EVIDENCE 
FROM MEXICAN SURVEY DATA, ECONOMIC REVIEW (First Quarter 2005). 
28 See Fagen & Bump, supra note 24, at 9.  A recent World Bank report 
noted “scant attention” paid to the impact of regulation on the flows of funds 
to poor and post-conflict nations.  The report suggested that “the effects of 
policies and regulations on the availability of financial services and the range 
of products available and attractive to a low-income clientele requires more 
attention and, in some cases, reduced regulatory burdens to make them viable. 
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 71. 
 29  See Fagen & Bump, supra note 24, at 10. 
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elements has resulted instead in a system where the 
small operations most likely to serve particularly 
difficult areas are at a decided disadvantage.30 
While these studies concerned regulatory controls 
designed primarily to prevent money laundering and to restrict 
the flow of funds to criminal and terrorist organizations, some of 
the same unintended effects may be seen with respect to the new 
consumer protection regulations mandated by section 1073 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
A. Legislative History 
Section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the EFTA 
by providing for detailed disclosures of numerous items in 
connection with a remittance transaction, establishing rules for 
correcting errors in the remittance process, and authorizing fines 
and civil actions for failure to comply with various mandates.31 
The impetus for this part of the legislation may be traced 
to a 2005 report issued by the Appleseed Fund for Justice and 
Appleseed Foundation (“Appleseed”) calling for greater 
transparency in the remittance market.32 The report found that 
the then-existing disclosures often made it hard for consumers to 
understand the full costs of sending a remittance before they 
engage in a transaction, including transaction fees and the 
exchange rate spread. In 2007, Appleseed testified before the 
House Committee on Financial Services that immigrants face 
enormous fluctuations and inconsistencies in pricing for 
remittances, even within the same company.33 Appleseed 
recommended that the Federal Reserve Board should be granted 
                                                     
 30  See Fagen & Bump, supra note 24, at 11. 
 31  15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1(2012). 
 32  Ana Baddour & Sonja Danburg, Creating a Fair Playing Field for 
Consumers: The Need for Transparency in the U.S.‐Mexico Remittance Market 
(Appleseed, 2005). 
 33  Remittances: Access, Transparency, and Market Efficiency: A Progress 
Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int’l Monetary Policy, 
Trade, and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) 
(statement of Annette LoVoi, Field Director, Appleseed). 
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rulemaking authority to delineate disclosure requirements, in 
consultation with consumer participants and representatives of 
the remittance industry. In 2009, Appleseed again testified before 
the House Financial Services Committee, but in this testimony, 
they recommended specific minimum disclosures.34 In particular, 
Appleseed felt that baseline disclosures must include the fee for 
sending the remittance; the current exchange rate; the day and 
time the remittance will be available for pick up; and a sample of 
the remittance cost.35 Appleseed also recommended that 
disclosure should occur visually before the transaction; that there 
should be a mechanism for error resolution; and that disclosures 
should be both in English and in the foreign language used in the 
three markets that the provider sends most of the remittances.36 
B. Legislative Text 
Interestingly, various studies have found that increasing 
competition in the marketplace and other factors drove down the 
cost of remittance transfers, especially in the Latin American 
market, without the need for further regulation.37 Nevertheless, 
Congress adopted a new and comprehensive remittance law in 
the Dodd-Frank Act, in order to “establish minimum protections 
for remittances sent by consumers in the United States to other 
                                                     
 34  Remittances: Regulation and Disclosure in a New Economic 
Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. of the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 8-9 (2009) (statement of Annette LoVoi, Field Director, 
Appleseed). 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37   See, e.g., MANUEL OROZCO, INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF 
REMITTANCES: COST, COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL ACCESS IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN—TOWARD AN INDUSTRY SCORECARD 4 
(2006), available at www.iadb.org/news/docs/internationalflows.pdf 
(Technology may also be a driving factor). See also THE WORLD BANK, 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES 
AND MIGRATION 137–38 (2006); Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 
Fed. Reg. 6194, 6199 (Feb. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 1005). The 
U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) found that the average cost of 
sending remittances from the United States to Latin America (particularly 
Mexico) declined from 12.5 percent to 7 percent between 2003 and 2005, and 
where comparable to the fees charged by banks, credit unions and the U.S. 
Postal Service. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-006-204, 
INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES 3-4 (2005). 
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countries.”38 The legislation was based on the concern that 
senders of remittance transfers “face significant problems with 
their remittance transfers, including being overcharged or not 
having the funds reach intended recipients.”39 
Pursuant to section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act, before 
making a remittance transfer to a foreign country, a remittance 
transfer provider40 must disclose, at the time when the consumer 
requests a remittance transfer, but prior to making any payment: 
the amount of currency to be received by the recipient in the 
currency to be received; the amount of any fees charged by the 
transfer provider; and the exchange rate accurate to the one-
hundredth of one percent.41 
Following the payment of money to the remittance 
transfer provider, the customer must obtain a written receipt that 
includes all of the information disclosed before payment, the 
promised date of delivery, the name of the recipient, a statement 
about consumer rights for error resolution, and the state and 
federal agencies that regulate the provider.42 
Disclosures must be in English and in each of the foreign 
languages principally used by the remittance transfer provider, or 
any of its agents, to advertise, solicit, or market, either orally or in 
writing, at that office.43 Disclosures must be accurate when made, 
but the statute specifically provides that insured depository 
institutions may be allowed by the regulator to use reasonably 
accurate estimates for a five-year period, ending on July 21, 2015, 
unless further extended by regulations.44 With respect to errors, 
the statute provides that if a remittance transfer provider receives 
oral or written notice from the sender within 180 days of the 
promised date of delivery that an error occurred, the provider 
                                                     
 38  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 176(2010). 
 39  Id. 
 40  Defined to include any institution that makes remittance transfers to a 
foreign country in the regular course of business.  The CFPB regulation states 
that an institution is presumed not to meet this standard if it made less than 
100 transfers in the previous year, and continues to make less than 100 
transfers in the current year. 
 41  15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1(a)(2). 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. § 1693o-1(b). 
 44  Id. § 1693o-1(a)(4). 
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must investigate and resolve the dispute within 90 days.45 In 
addition, the statute further provides that a remittance transfer 
provider shall be liable for the acts of agents and authorized 
delegates.46  
IV. REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Final Rule and Delay 
The original regulatory proposal to implement section 
1073 was drafted by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, and published for comment by that agency on 
May 23, 2011.47 On July 21, 2011, regulatory authority was 
transferred to the CFPB.48 This agency issued a final regulation 
and a series of interpretations implementing section 1073 of 
Dodd-Frank Act on February 7, 2012 (“February Final Rule”).49  
Prior to the rule going into effect, the Bureau issued a new 
proposed regulation December 31, 2012 that would make several 
significant changes in its original rule,50 and at the same time 
announced that it was going to delay the effective date of the 
February Final Rule until after it considered the proposed 
amendments.51 
                                                     
 45  Id. § 1693o-1(d). 
 46  Id. § 1693o-1(f). 
 47  Electronic Fund Transfers, 76 Fed. Reg. 29902 (proposed May 23, 2011) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 205). 
 48  Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5582 (authorizing the Secretary of the 
Treasury to designate a specific date for the transfer of consumer protection 
functions from the Federal banking agencies to the CFPB).  The Secretary 
selected July 21, 2011 as the designated transfer date.  75 Fed. Reg. 57252-3533 
(Sept. 20, 2010). 
 49  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) 77 Fed. Reg. at 6194; 
Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) 77 Fed. Reg. 50244, 50282 (Aug. 20, 
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 1005) (The CFPB issued a modification to 
the final rule, establishing that a company that made less than 100 remittance 
transfers in a year was not covered by the regulation. The August amendment 
also addressed compliance issues raised when remittance transfers are 
scheduled on a regular basis in advance). 
 50  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 77188 
(proposed Dec. 31, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 1005). 
 51  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) Temporary Delay of 
Effective Date, 78 Fed. Reg. 6025 (Jan. 29, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 
1005). 
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The regulatory implementation to date creates a number 
of practical compliance problems for remittance transfer 
providers that could well result in increasing the cost of, or 
reducing the availability of, remittance services.52 However, the 
adverse impact of these regulations on remittances to post-
conflict countries will be much greater than for remittances sent 
to countries that have a stable and well-functioning government 
with a transparent financial regulatory structure. 
The most significant problems include harsh penalties 
imposed on remittance companies for minor or inadvertent 
misstatements relating to the mandated disclosures; the 
imposition of liability for the acts of literally thousands of agents 
and representatives around the globe; and the costs imposed on 
remittance companies to correct mistakes even if the mistake was 
due to customer errors.53 Even the CFPB has expressed concern 
that the new regulatory structure may result in companies exiting 
the field or reducing offerings by not sending remittances to areas 
where it would be more difficult to obtain the data that must be 
disclosed prior to initiating a remittance transaction.54 Recently, 
the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York announced that in 
                                                     
 52  See, e.g., Joint Trade Association Comment Letter on the Proposed 
Amendments to Regulation E to Implement Section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, Fed. Reserve Bd., Docket No. 1419 (July 22, 2011). The CFPB 
acknowledged the possibility of adverse consequences of its regulation, 
including increased consumer costs and a decrease in the availability of 
remittance services. See generally Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 
77 Fed. Reg. 6194, 6201-02, 6208, 6218, 6220, 6224, 6279-82. (Feb. 7, 2012) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 1005). 
 53  Any company that fails to comply with the EFTA or implementing 
regulations will face civil liability for actual damages and statutory damages of 
between $100 and $100) per violation. Class action liability for each violation 
is capped at $500,000 or 1 percent of the net worth of the company, whichever 
is less.  Attorney fees are also awarded in a successful claim. 15 U.S.C. §1693m 
(2012). In addition, the CFPB may levy administrative civil money penalties.  
15 U.S.C. § 1693o (2012). Intentional violations are subject to criminal 
penalties including imprisonment for up to one year. 15 U.S.C. § 1693n (2012). 
 54  According to the CFPB, “some remittance transfer providers and 
industry associations have indicated that some providers are considering 
exiting the market or reducing their offerings, such as by not sending transfers 
to corridors where tax or fee information is particularly difficult to obtain, or 
by limiting the size or type of transfers sent in order to reduce any risk 
associated with mis-deposited transfers.” Electronic Fund Transfers 
(Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. at 77190. 
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response to the new regulatory environment, it would no longer 
be providing remittance transfer services for its member 
institutions.55 
With respect to remittance transfers to post-conflict 
nations, disclosures relating to third party fees, exchange rates, 
and foreign taxes are especially troubling. The remainder of this 
section will explain the nature of the compliance problems caused 
by the regulation, recent efforts by the CFPB to address at least 
some of these concerns, and why much more needs to be done in 
response. 
B. Disclosure of Third Party Fees 
1. Disclosure Required Under the Final Rule 
Pursuant to the final regulation issued on February 7, 
2012, remittance transfer companies must provide “accurate” 
disclosures before any money is exchanged (pre-payment 
disclosures) and a post-payment receipt that contains the pre-
payment information, as well as additional disclosures. One of the 
more problematic requirements is to disclose all fees that may be 
charged by third parties, whether or not the remittance transfer 
provider has knowledge of such fees or taxes.56 The February 
Final Rule provides that insured depository institutions may 
make good faith estimates of these fees if they lack actual 
knowledge,57 but the agency chose not to exercise its discretion to 
afford similar treatment to other remittance providers.58 Thus, 
under the final regulation, fees imposed by third-parties must be 
itemized and accurately disclosed, even if the amount of the fee is 
not known by the remittance transfer provider when the 
transaction is initiated. 
                                                     
 55  Press Release, Federal Home Loan Bank of New York, FHLBNY to 
Stop Processing International Wire Transfers at Year-End (Nov. 30, 2012) 
available at www.fhlbny.com/news-events/press-releases/prior-
releases/2012/press112012.aspx. 
 56  12 C.F.R. § 1005.31 (2011).  
 57  See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1(a)(4) (2010) (specifically authorizes the CFPB to 
allow insured depository institutions to use estimates for certain disclosures). 
 58  The regulation tracks the statute in this case, since 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-
1(a)(4) allows the CFPB to authorize estimates for insured depository 
institutions until July 21, 2015, unless further extended by the agency. 
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There are several reasons why remittance providers may 
not be able to comply with the disclosure requirement when 
transmitting funds to post-conflict countries. For example, 
remittance funds may be sent abroad either through a “closed 
network,” in which all of the intermediaries are agents of the 
remittance provider, or through an “open network,” such as 
through wire transfers.59 An open network is composed of 
intermediary financial institutions.60 The funds are transmitted 
from one financial institution to another as it winds its way to the 
recipient. Its transaction may be routed differently, depending 
upon a number of factors. Therefore, when funds are transmitted 
through an open network, the specific intermediary institutions 
and the exact amount of third party transaction fees cannot be 
determined beforehand.61  When funds are transmitted to a post-
conflict region, the remittance provider is much less likely to have 
control over the intermediaries, and very unlikely to have an 
office or other presence in the region. As a result, the open 
network framework will be predominate, and the remittance 
provider will not be able to determine in advance the exact route 
that the funds will transverse nor the fees that will be imposed by 
third party intermediaries. 
The problem is also made worse in post-conflict nations 
where the transparency and sufficiency of the financial regulatory 
                                                     
 59   Wire transfers are generally open network transactions that can reach 
virtually any bank worldwide through national payment systems that are 
connected through correspondent and other intermediary bank relationships. 
Providers of wire transfers usually charge up-front fees at the time of the 
transaction. In some cases, intermediary institutions impose additional fees 
(sometimes referred to as ‘‘lifting fees’’) and recipient institutions may also 
charge fees for converting funds into local currency and/or depositing them 
into recipients’ accounts. See generally Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation 
E), 77 Fed. Reg. 6194, 6194-98 (Feb. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 
1005) (in depth discussion of open networks and wire transfers). 
 60  Id. at 6197. 
 61  In an open network, the sending institution may not have a contractual 
relationship with the receiving institution. Rather, in an open network 
transaction, the sending institution will send payment instructions and funds 
to a correspondent institution, which will then transmit the instructions and 
funds to the recipient institution directly or indirectly through other 
intermediary institutions. The identity of the intermediary institutions is not 
always known because more than one transfer route is possible. There is no 
global practice regarding communication between these various institutions 
regarding fees. Id. 
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structure may be lacking. Without a strong financial regulatory 
structure, entities receiving remittance payments for 
disbursement to the recipient may be able to establish fees that 
vary based on local economic conditions, relationships with the 
consumer, or other factors intrinsic to that particular entity.  In 
some cultures, the exact fee that some third parties may charge 
could be subject to negotiation and bargaining between the 
consumer and the paying entity. The U.S. regulatory 
requirements for advance notice and/or publication of consumer 
fees is certainly not the norm in many parts of the post-conflict 
world, and the regulatory language does not take that into 
account.62 
2. Proposed Regulatory Fix 
The preamble to the December 31, 2012 proposed 
amendment acknowledged the practical difficulties of requiring 
disclosures of third-party fees, especially when open networks are 
utilized, as would be the case in many post-conflict areas.63 
Nevertheless, the proposal does not address the problem of fee 
disclosures for open network transmittals, but instead provides a 
narrow and cumbersome exception for the requirement to 
disclose the exact amount of fees charged by third-parties.  
Surprisingly, this proposal does not deal with the fees that are 
charged by intermediary institutions in an open network 
transmittal. 
As an alternative to disclosing the exact amount of the fee 
that a third-party receiving institution may charge, the December 
                                                     
 62  See, e.g., Bedman Narteh, Challenges of Marketing E-Banking Services 
in a Developing Country: The Case of Ghana, 17 J. of Internet Banking and 
Comm., August 2012, at 10; Laura Brix & Katharine McKee, Consumer 
Protection Regulation in Low-Access Environments: Opportunities to Promote 
Responsible Finance, CGAP Focus Note No. 60, February 2010. 
 63   Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 77188, 77190 
(proposed Dec. 31, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 1005) (“originating 
providers  . . . using open networks or other systems that deposit transfers into 
accounts generally cannot, under current practice, determine fees for receiving 
transfers imposed by institutions that provide accounts and assess fees 
pursuant to an agreement between the recipient institution and the recipient.  
The magnitude of the concern may be greater for providers that allow senders 
to send remittances to a broad range of geographic areas, which traditionally 
have included open network providers.”). 
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proposal would allow a non-bank64 remittance transfer provider 
to disclose the highest possible fee that the receiving entity may 
charge, but only if the remittance service provider “does not have 
specific knowledge regarding variables that affect the amount of 
fees imposed by a designated recipient’s institution for receiving a 
transfer in an account.”65 This proposed regulatory language is 
convoluted. For example, section (4) of the December proposal, 
titled “Permanent exception where variables affect recipient 
institution fees,” states: 
 (i) . . . if a remittance transfer provider does not have 
specific knowledge regarding variables that affect the 
amount of fees imposed by a designated recipient’s 
institution for receiving a transfer in an account, the 
provider may disclose the highest possible recipient 
institution fees that could be imposed on the remittance 
transfer with respect to any unknown variable, as 
determined based on either fee schedules made 
available by the recipient institution or information 
ascertained from prior transfers to the same recipient 
institution. 
(ii) If the provider cannot obtain such fee schedules or 
does not have such information, a provider may rely on 
other reasonable sources of information, if the provider 
discloses the highest fees identified through the relied-
upon source.66 
                                                     
 64  Insured depository institutions would continue (at least until July 21, 
2015) to be authorized to provide good faith estimates of fees. 12 CFR 
§ 1005.32(a). 
 65  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) 77 Fed. Reg. at 77211 (the 
phrase “specific knowledge regarding variables that affect the amount of fees 
imposed by a designated recipient’s institution for receiving a transfer in an 
account” raises significant issues. It is possible that under this language the 
information that a particular agent or authorized representative has 
concerning a local fee will be imputed to the parent company.  Thus, if an 
agent or authorized representative in Mali knows of a specific fee charged by a 
village bank, and fails to convey that information to the remittance provider in 
the U.S., the U.S. remittance provider may nevertheless be deemed to have 
“specific knowledge” of the fee.  This would make use of the alternative 
disclosure of the “highest possible fee” impossible). 
 66  Id. 
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 The proposed regulation falls short for a number of reasons.  
First, for non-bank remittance providers, the proposal does not 
provide any relief for remittances carried over open networks, 
such as wire transfers or the Automated Clearinghouse System 
(“ACH”).67  The exact amount of fees charged by open network 
intermediaries must be disclosed prior to and at the time a 
consumer initiates a remittance transfer. However, this 
information is unknowable under current systems until after the 
remittance transaction has been completed and the funds 
delivered. Remittances to post-conflict countries rely more 
heavily on open networks since these companies are less able to 
move funds through closed networks in areas with a higher 
potential for violence, damaged transportation and other 
necessary infrastructure, high levels of poverty, and a lack of 
governmental regulatory oversight and police protection. If the 
use of open networks is restricted because the fees cannot be 
determined with certainty before the transaction in entered into, 
the result will be significantly less availability for regulated 
transfers, and consumers will be driven to use unregulated 
methods of remitting funds to these areas. 
Another significant drawback to the proposed remedy is 
that it only applies to receiving entities that are “institutions,” and 
the transfer must be made into an “account.”68 Thus, the 
proposed rule does not apply to transfers in which the receiving 
                                                     
 67  The ACH system is a funds transfer system that provides for the 
clearing and settlement of batched electronic transfers for participating 
depository institutions. In contrast, wires transfers are typically higher-dollar, 
individual (not batched) credit transactions that settle between depository 
institutions immediately. The originator of an ACH transfer generally 
authorizes its depository institution to send a payment instruction. The 
depository institution combines the payment instruction with payment 
instructions from its other customers and sends them to an ACH operator—the 
Federal Reserve Banks’ FedACH or The Clearing House’s Electronic 
Payments Network—for processing. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF AUTOMATED 
CLEARING SYSTEMS FOR REMITTANCE TRANSFERS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
(July 4 2011). 
 68   Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. at 77196. See  
also Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. at 77188 
(explaining that: “the proposal would provide additional flexibility regarding 
the disclosure of foreign taxes, as well as fees imposed by a designated 
recipient’s institution for receiving a remittance transfer in an account”). 
NatterArticle(Do Not Delete)  5/1/2013  9:08 PM 
2013 Remittances to Post-Conflict Countries 419 
entity is not an institution that is holding consumer accounts. For 
example, the proposed rule would not apply when the receiving 
entity is a grocery store, church or mosque, post office, or a 
facility of a non-governmental organization providing technical 
or financial assistance to the local community.69 Once again, post-
conflict areas that are not likely to have a widely dispersed 
system of local functioning or trusted financial institutions will be 
placed at a disadvantage. 
Even if the receiving entity is an institution that is holding 
the customer’s account, the amount of fees charged for the 
transfer may depend upon a multitude of factors. For example, 
the ability of a remittance company located in Chicago to know 
on any particular day the fees that a village bank in a post-
conflict country, like South Sudan, is charging its customers to 
receive a remittance is essentially nil. The fees can change on a 
day-to-day or customer-to-customer basis, fee schedules can be 
modified with little notice, and communication about such 
changes outside of the village may never occur. 
The proposed rule allows a remittance provider to rely on 
other reasonable sources of information to estimate the receiving 
institution’s highest possible fee, including representations made 
by the sender. This provides some benefit for remittances sent to 
an institution holding a consumer’s account, but provides no 
flexibility for remittances sent to other entities. However, it still 
may be difficult to comply with the notice requirement. It is not 
easy or inexpensive for a remittance company to obtain and keep 
current the various fee schedules that thousands of institutions 
throughout the world use when setting fees, but it becomes a near 
impossible task to obtain this information and to keep it current 
for all possible receiving institutions located in post-conflict areas. 
In an additional attempt to ease the regulatory burden of 
complying with the disclosure rules, the proposed regulation 
allows the remittance provider to rely on representations made by 
the sender as to the fees that will be charged by the receiving 
                                                     
 69   Under the FedGlobal’s Latin American ACH service the receiver does 
not need a deposit account at a depository institution.  The international ACH 
transfer must be originated from a deposit account in the United States, but 
the funds may be sent to a specifically approved depository institution or a 
trusted third-party provider in the foreign country where the receiver may pick 
up the funds in cash without a deposit account at the receiving institution.  See 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 67, at 10. 
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institution.70 But, in many cases, the sender, living in the United 
States, will not know the potential fees and the variables that 
may affect the cost to the ultimate recipient.71 The proposed 
regulation simply does not take into account the characteristics of 
post-conflict areas that do not have robust regulatory oversight 
over financial companies, and that may not even have advance 
notice requirements for changes in service fees and charges. 
C. Foreign Taxes 
1. Disclosure Required Under the Final Rule 
Under the February Final Rule, remittance providers 
must disclose all taxes imposed on a remittance transfer, 
including taxes assessed by a local, state, provincial or regional 
foreign government.72  Insured depository institution may provide 
good faith estimates of the amount of such taxes (at least until 
July 21, 2015), but all other remittance transfer providers must 
provide exact amounts. In many areas of the world compliance 
with this requirement would be difficult. In post-conflict 
countries, there is a much higher likelihood that local taxes will 
be unknown and subject to frequent change. The taxes imposed 
by local governmental units, including towns and small villages, 
will vary depending on changing circumstances, local economic 
conditions and political disruption. There is no central body that 
tracks these fees and taxes, and even if such a registry existed, it 
is unlikely that it would include local villages or small towns in 
post-conflict regions. Thus, this will be a problem for transfers to 
many areas and is a particularly significant problem for post-
conflict areas. 
                                                     
 70  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. at 77213 
(Proposed Official Interpretation of 31(b)(1)(vi) and 31(d)). 
 71  For example, the receiving institution may vary fees based on the total 
balance held by its customers, or on the existence of loans, or on the number of 
transactions. It is unlikely that the remittance customer who has been residing 
in the U.S. for a number of years would have the requisite knowledge to state 
the maximum fees that could be charged to any particular recipient. 
 72  12 C.F.R. § 1005.31. 
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2. Proposed Changes 
The CFPB recognized the impracticality of requiring 
disclosure of local taxes, and in December 2012, it proposed to 
eliminate the requirement for remittance providers to disclose 
taxes that are not imposed by a foreign country’s “central 
government.”73  The December proposal then went on to state 
that if a non-bank74 remittance provider does not have “specific 
knowledge” of the “variables” that affect the amount of the 
foreign country’s central government tax on the remittance, it 
may disclose instead the “highest possible tax that could be 
imposed on the remittance transfer with respect to any unknown 
variable.”75 Remittance providers would be able to rely on 
representations made by the sender regarding foreign taxes. 
There are a number of problems with this proposed 
regulation. The term “central government” is not defined, and in 
many areas of the world, it may not be clear which, if any, body 
constitutes the “central government.” In the United Kingdom, for 
example, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have various 
degrees of autonomy. Countries torn by civil war, such as Mali 
and Syria, may have more than one entity that claims to be the 
“central government.” Kurdistan is an autonomous region in Iraq, 
and it is not clear if that region is under the authority of 
Baghdad. Another problem with the use of the term “central 
government” is whether it includes taxes or fees imposed by 
independent governmental entities. For example, taxes can be 
imposed by the treasury or finance ministry, but could also be 
imposed by another unit of the government, such as a central 
bank, reconstruction and development authority, or regulatory 
body. The regulation should clarify which of these possible taxes 
are to be considered taxes imposed by the central government. 
Another troubling problem with the proposal is that it 
requires remittance providers to disclose an unknown variable. 
                                                     
 73  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 63, at 77211 
(proposing an amendment to 12 CFR § 1005.31(b)(vi)). 
 74  Insured depository institutions have more flexibility to estimate taxes, 
at least until July 21, 2015. 12 C.F.R. § 1005.32(a). 
 75  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 63, at 77211 
(proposing an amendment to 12 CFR § 1005.32(b)(3). The use of the phrase 
“specific knowledge” in connection with the tax disclosure also raises the same 
interpretative problem when that term is used in the fee disclosure section. Id. 
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The proposal states that if the remittance transfer provider does 
not have specific knowledge “regarding variables that affect the 
amount of taxes” imposed by a foreign central government, the 
provider may disclose instead the “highest possible tax that could 
be imposed on the remittance transfer with respect to any 
unknown variable.”76 If a variable is unknown, it would seem 
logical to dictate that it would be impossible to determine the 
highest possible tax. As the CFPB acknowledges, the amount of 
taxes may depend upon any number of factors that each 
particular foreign central government may choose to use.77 For 
example, if the central bank decides to impose an additional tax 
on a remittance transfer to a resident non-citizen, but this fact is 
unknown to the remittance transfer company, it would be 
impossible to comply with the regulatory requirement to disclose 
the highest possible tax with respect to the citizenship variable. 
Perhaps due to the practical difficulty of determining the 
highest possible tax that may be imposed, the proposal also 
allows, in certain cases, for a remittance transfer company to rely 
on the representations of its customer regarding the amount of tax 
that will be imposed by the foreign central government.78 It is 
possible that some senders may be very willing to provide the 
remittance provider with statements regarding the foreign central 
government’s taxes and the applicability of those taxes to the 
particular person receiving the funds transfer. However, when 
funds are sent to post-conflict areas, it becomes much more likely 
that the sender will not be willing to provide such information, 
assuming that the sender even knows the type and amount of 
taxes that will be levied. As discussed above, in post-conflict 
nations there is often a distrust of the government authorities and 
agencies, a significant amount of corruption, and a lack of strong 
supervisory oversight and controls. In this environment, tax 
levies may change overnight, and the enforcement of the tax laws 
may be arbitrary. There may be widespread concern that 
discussing tax issues with a remittance provider could lead to 
difficulties with the tax authorities in the foreign country. 
                                                     
 76  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 63, at 77211. 
 77  Id. at 77213 (“The amount of taxes . . . may depend on the tax status of 
the sender or recipient, the type of accounts or financial institutions involved 
in the transfer, or other variables.”). 
 78  Id. (proposed comment 31(b)(1)(vi)(2)). 
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Moreover, it could result in consumer confusion that the 
remittance transfer provider may somehow be connected to the 
taxing authority of the foreign country. In short, requiring the 
sender to make assertions about the foreign country’s taxes easily 
could inhibit the use of regulated remittance providers and 
encourage the use of unregulated informal methods of 
transferring funds across national borders.  Clearly, this is not in 
the public interest. 
D. Exchange Rates 
The final regulation requires a remittance transfer 
provider to disclose the exchange rate used by the provider, 
rounded consistently for each currency to no fewer than two 
decimal places and no more than four decimal places.79 
While the exchange rate may be determined with certainty 
for certain products, this is not true in all cases. In post-conflict 
countries there will likely be far more volatility in the exchange 
rate than in more settled nations. To account for this risk, 
remittance companies may offer transfers with an exchange rate 
that is set when the recipient picks up the funds.80 
Other issues are created when the transfers are conducted 
through open networks. As noted previously, remittance transfers 
to post-conflict nations are more likely to rely on open network 
systems than transfers to other areas. Determining the exchange 
rate in advance in open network transactions is not always 
possible.81 A sending institution may exchange the currency at the 
time of transfer, using an exchange rate that the sending 
institution sets. In such cases, the principal amount will then be 
transferred in the foreign currency. Even if the funds are to be 
received in a foreign currency, however, the sending financial 
institution may not conduct the foreign exchange itself. Some 
financial institutions, particularly smaller institutions, may not 
participate in any foreign currency markets.82 In other cases, the 
                                                     
 79  12 C.F.R. § 1005.31(b)(1)(iv). 
 80  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 37, at 6196 (so 
called “floating rate” transfers are described). 
 81  See generally Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 37, 
at 6196-97. 
 82  Id. at 6197 (discussion of the mechanics of setting foreign exchange 
rates). 
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sending institution may choose not to trade an illiquid currency 
or a consumer may request that the transfer be sent in U.S. 
dollars. In these cases, the first cross-border intermediary 
institution in the recipient’s country, or the recipient’s institution, 
may set the exchange rate that applies to the transfer. Under 
these conditions, the remittance company may not know the exact 
exchange rate that will be applied until the transferred funds are 
received. 
The potential for making an error of as little as one-
hundredth of one percent when disclosing exchange rates could 
well create significant risks to the remittance provider, especially 
when making a transfer to a post-conflict country. As a result, the 
cost of such transfers may increase, or the availability of such 
services through regulated companies may be inhibited.83 And 
once again, post-conflict nations will typically have more volatile 
movements in exchange rates, and, thus, will be particularly 
disadvantaged by strict application of this disclosure 
requirement. 
E. Date When Funds Will Be Available 
The receipt that must be given by the remittance transfer 
provider to the sender must include the date in the foreign 
country on which funds will be available to the designated 
recipient.84 Due to the instability in post-conflict countries, 
remittance providers may not be able to provide a firm date by 
which the funds will be available in all cases. CFPB guidance 
appears to recognize that fighting and other disruptions may 
delay the date on which funds will be ready for disbursement, 
and provides an exception for war or civil unrest, natural 
                                                     
 83   Id. at 6220 (a discussion of comments including a Federal Reserve 
Bank commenter, as well as industry commenters, arguing that requiring a 
fixed exchange rate for purposes of providing an exchange rate disclosure 
would result in less favorable exchange rates for senders. These commenters 
stated that if providers are required to fix the exchange rate, they will increase 
the spread they use in order to minimize the risks associated with rate 
volatility, so the cost of sending remittance transfers would increase for 
senders. A major remittance transfer provider warned the CFPB that it would 
stop providing service to approximately 10,000 foreign locations that currently 
offer only floating rates). 
 84  12 C.F.R. § 1005.31(b)(2). 
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disaster, garnishment or attachment of the funds after the 
transfer is sent, and government actions or restrictions that could 
not have been reasonably anticipated by the remittance transfer 
provider, such as the imposition of foreign currency controls.85  
There are two problems with this provision. First, many of 
the causes for delay in receiving funds when sent to a post-
conflict region can be anticipated, but the length or severity of the 
disruption cannot be determined in advance. The CFPB was 
notified during the comment period that infrastructure 
deficiencies in some countries may make it impossible to 
determine the actual date on which funds will be available.86 
Second, the exception for governmental actions requires 
that the actions could not have been reasonably anticipated by 
the remittance provider.87 With respect to post-conflict areas, it 
may be difficult to establish that a particular governmental action 
that results in a delay in availability could not have been 
“reasonably anticipated.” 
F. Foreign Laws Prohibiting Compliance 
In its August 20, 2012 rule, the CFPB addressed the 
problem that the laws of certain foreign countries effectively 
prohibit compliance with its disclosure requirements.88 As such, 
the CFPB created an exception that permits remittance transfer 
providers to use estimates, rather than exact numbers, if the 
provider cannot determine the exact amounts when disclosure is 
required because of a recipient nation’s laws.89 However, since 
                                                     
 85  12 C.F.R.  § 1005.33. 
 86   Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 37, at 6227. 
 87  12 C.F.R.  § 1005.33. 
 88  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) 77 Fed. Reg. 50244 (Aug. 20, 
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 1005). 
 89  The August regulation also created an exception for international ACH 
transfers where the terms of the transfer have been negotiated by the United 
States Government and the recipient country’s government, and where the 
exchange rate is set by the recipient country on the business day after the 
provider has sent the remittance transfer. The CFPB has published a list of the 
countries that qualify under the second exception.  These countries are: Aruba, 
Brazil, China, Ethiopia, and Libya. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU, REMITTANCE RULE SAFE HARBOR COUNTRIES LIST (Sep. 26, 2012), 
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201209_CFPB_Remittance-
Rule-Safe-Harbor-Countries-List.pdf. 
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this exception only applies when there is a national law that 
prevents compliance with the disclosures, it will not be of 
assistance when compliance is made impossible due to the local 
political, economic, regulatory and social conditions, such as may 
exist in post-conflict nations. 
G. CFPB Can Do More 
In its February rulemaking, the CFPB rejected calls to 
allow remittance providers to use estimates when disclosing third 
party fees, even when the transmittal is made through open 
networks.90 The agency acknowledged that open networks 
created “compliance challenges,” but nevertheless concluded that 
the disclosures were required by section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act: 
The Bureau acknowledges the compliance challenges 
raised by the inclusion of open network transactions. 
Nevertheless, the Bureau believes the unambiguous 
language of the statute requires coverage of these 
transactions, such as wire transfers. The Bureau finds 
no statutory language to support excluding open 
network transactions—indeed, quite the contrary: the 
statute includes a temporary exception for certain 
insured institutions permitting estimates to be used in 
providing disclosures under specified circumstances. . . . 
There would be no need for such an exception if open 
network transactions were not covered by the statute.91 
The CFPB also rejected proposals to allow remittance 
providers to use estimated exchange rates when the precise 
exchange rate cannot be determined. The agency noted the 
concerns raised by a Federal Reserve Bank as well as other 
commenters that the requirement could lead to the imposition of 
a less favorable rate for senders and reduced availability of 
services.92 However, the CFPB concluded that the Dodd-Frank 
Act requires non-bank remittance providers to disclose the exact 
exchange rate, accurate to one-hundredth of one percent, both at 
                                                     
 90  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 37, at 6208. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 63, at 77213. 
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the time the sender first requests the remittance transfer and 
again when the sender pays for the transfer.93 As explained by the 
CFPB: 
The Bureau interprets the statute to require a 
remittance transfer provider to disclose to the sender the 
exchange rate to be used for the remittance transfer to 
the sender, both at the time the sender requests the 
remittance transfer and when the sender pays for the 
transfer. This interpretation is based on several factors. 
First, the fact that the exchange rate may be set by 
another institution involved in the remittance transfer 
does not change the fact that it will be used by the 
remittance transfer provider in effectuating the sender’s 
request. Second, the statute specifically requires 
disclosure of the amount to be received by the 
designated recipient, using the values of the currency 
into which the funds will be exchanged. This disclosure 
requires a provider to determine the exchange rate to be 
used to effectuate the transfer, whether that rate is set 
by the remittance transfer provider or a third party.94 
The CFPB also rejected requests to a remittance provider 
to disclose a good faith estimate of the date that funds will be 
available for pick up by the recipient. Again, the agency based its 
decision on its reading of the statutory language. The agency 
determined that the statute requires the disclosure of a “single 
promised date of delivery of the funds,” and that the statute 
precludes the use of an estimate of the promised date.95 The 
agency also found that because the statute requires a remittance 
transfer provider to provide a disclosure of the promised date of 
delivery to the designated recipient, a remittance provider could 
not use the date on which the funds would be available to the 
recipient institution, but must instead use the date that the funds 
will be made available to the recipient.96 
                                                     
 93  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), supra note 37, at 6221. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. at 6227. 
 96  Id. The CFPB, however, allows a remittance provider to provide a date 
further out than the actual expected delivery date, accompanied by a notice 
that the funds may be available sooner. For example, if funds may be available 
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H. The CFPB Has Considerable Discretion to Modify Statutory 
Requirements 
As discussed above, the CFPB is basing its decision not to 
provide meaningful relief for acknowledged practical difficulties 
with the disclosure mandates, primarily based on its 
determination that the statute requires such disclosures. Although 
one may reach a different conclusion as to the proper construction 
of the statutory provisions, the law is clear that in the case of any 
ambiguity of statutory language, the reasonable views of the 
agency charged with administering the statute will prevail.97 
However, the issue here is not what the statute mandates, but 
rather why the CFPB has not used its clear power to modify the 
statutory requirements to provide more flexibility in order to take 
into account special situations, such as the conditions that exist in 
post-conflict nations that make strict compliance with disclosure 
mandates difficult, if not impossible. 
The fact that the CFPB has broad authority to create 
exceptions and limitations to the statutory disclosure mandates is 
clear. To that end, section 904 of the EFTA governs all of the 
CFPB’s rulemakings under the EFTA.98 This section specifically 
states that the EFTA regulations may contain “such 
classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may 
provide for such adjustments and exemptions for any class of 
electronic fund transfers or remittance transfers, as in the 
judgment of the CFPB are necessary and proper to effectuate the 
EFTA.” Likewise, section 1022 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which is 
the CFPB’s general authority to issue regulations for federal 
consumer laws (including the EFTA), provides that the CFPB 
may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any class of covered 
persons, service providers, or consumer financial products from 
                                                     
on January 3, but are not certain to be available until January 10, then a 
provider complies with rule if it discloses January 10 as the date funds will be 
available, and includes a note that the funds may be available sooner. 12 
C.F.R. § 1005.31(b)(2)(ii). 
 97  See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), holding that ambiguities in statutes within an 
agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to 
fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. 
 98  15 U.S.C. § 1693b. 
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any rule.99 Taken together, these statutory provisions leave no 
question that the CFPB has plenary authority to develop 
regulations that can create exemptions, differentiations, 
adjustments and exceptions from the general requirements, the 
CFPB can classify products as subject to or not subject to 
regulation, and otherwise tailor its regulations to achieve the 
purposes of the EFTA and the policy objectives of section 1022 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act. The legal authority of the CFPB to make 
adjustments to the disclosure rules to take into account the 
special circumstances of post-conflict nations is clear. The 
absence of any explanation for why the CFPB has declined to 
exercise its authority to address the acknowledged difficulties in 
complying with the remittance regulation in certain cases (such as 
providing remittances to post-conflict countries) raises significant 
legal and public policy issues. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Dodd-Frank Act amendments to the Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act, and the implementing regulations issued by 
the CFPB, are intended to provide enhanced consumer 
protections to U.S. residents sending funds to foreign countries. 
The legislation and regulations were designed for a model in 
which the remittance transfers are subject to known rules and 
regulations, where all fees can be determined beforehand, and 
where exchange rates and timing can be predicted with near 
certainty. This model does not exist for remittances sent to many 
post-conflict countries. In these nations, the financial regulatory 
structure is weak, the political and legal infrastructure unstable, 
and corruption or fear of corruption prevalent. Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know with 
certainty many of the facts that the regulation requires remittance 
providers to disclose accurately when the remittance is initiated. 
The CFPB has made attempts to deal with these issues, but much 
more needs to be done to assure that these new rules will not 
inhibit fund transfers to post-conflict regions.  
The CFPB position appears to be that it is following the 
statutory requirements, and has chosen not to provide exceptions 
for many of the most problematic disclosure requirements. 
                                                     
 99  12 U.S.C. § 5512 (b)(3). 
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However, the statute clearly states that the CFPB may make 
such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may 
provide for such adjustments and exemptions for any class of 
remittance transfers, as in the judgment of the CFPB, that are 
necessary and proper to effectuate the statute. The unexplained 
failure of the CFPB to use its authority to adjust the required 
disclosures raises significant legal and public policy issues. At the 
very least, the CFPB should make adjustments necessary to 
ensure that remittance transfers to post-conflict countries are not 
unnecessarily impeded by its rules. 
